Security

Data flow

• Local reviews keep code on the workstation.
• Server reviews send selected files only to the configured host.
• Forge reviews fetch code through the configured forge credentials and post results back to that forge.
• There is no telemetry. Network destinations are the configured review host, its release endpoint, the selected forge and issue providers, and the selected LLM provider.

Detected secret values are never copied into finding messages. Learnings that suppress security rules are operator policy and should be reviewed like code.

Credentials

Server API keys identify the operator or team deployment. OAuth codes expire in ten minutes and refresh/access tokens are hashed at rest. GitHub App private keys stay server-side and produce short-lived installation tokens. GitLab, Bitbucket, Jira, Linear, web-search and LLM credentials are read only from the server environment.

Webhook authenticity uses GitHub HMAC, Bitbucket HMAC or secret URL, and the GitLab token header. Configure every exposed webhook secret. Task cloning inherits only the server process Git credentials; builds and external tools should run in a sandboxed service account.

Local state

The CLI state directory contains authentication material and review history. Protect it like an SSH configuration directory. auth logout removes stored authentication.

Limits

Review bodies are capped at 100 MiB. API keys can have an hourly review budget. The Docker service runs as the non-root Node user. Capture-relay traces redact credential headers and key fields, but can still contain code diffs; keep them local and treat them as source data.

Dependencies

A dependency inventory is generated for every release build and kept with the release evidence. Third-party dependencies keep their own licenses.